On paper, it looked like one of the biggest token heists of the year: billions of token units appearing out of nowhere across NuNet, SingularityNET and World Mobile. In practice, the attacker walked away with about $2.25 million. The gap between those two numbers is the whole story.
Starting on the evening of Saturday, September 19, 2026, a single attacker drained Fetch.ai’s token converter and then used compromised signing keys to mint unbacked tokens on several connected projects. Most of what was minted turned out to be almost impossible to sell.
Key facts
- On the evening of September 19, 2026, about 8.7 million FET (roughly $1.53 million) was withdrawn from Fetch.ai’s conversion contract in a single transaction.
- About 30 minutes later, 408.5 million NTX were minted to the same address cluster through a NuNet account, pushing NTX supply from about 591 million to its 1 billion maximum, per Bitquery.
- On September 20, the SingularityNET bridge was hit: PeckShield counted 260 million AGIX and 53.838 million WMTx minted without backing.
- Realized profit was only about $2.25 million, mostly from selling the real FET for 523 ETH (about $1.2 million); 500 million CGV sold for roughly $30.
- PeckShield valued what remained on attacker addresses at about $16.77 million, mostly 198.3 million AGIX ($14.42 million) and 649 ETH.
- A further $289,575 in USDC was later drained from a payroll contract.
What happened to Fetch.ai, NuNet and SingularityNET on September 19?
An attacker holding valid signing keys drained Fetch.ai’s token converter on September 19, 2026, then minted unbacked NTX, AGIX, WMTx and CGV over the next day. Analysts linked all of it to one address cluster. The FET was real; most of the newly minted tokens had no backing and little liquidity behind them.
According to ForkLog, the first move was the withdrawal of about 8.7 million FET from Fetch.ai’s conversion contract. Roughly half an hour later, 408.5 million NTX were minted through a NuNet account to addresses in the same cluster. On September 20 the SingularityNET bridge followed, with PeckShield counting 260 million AGIX and 53.838 million WMTx created without anything locked on the other side.
Bitquery’s wider count was larger: about 896 million AGIX, 500.5 million WMTx and 492.4 million CGV, with roughly 2.3 billion token units affected once FET is included.
How the converter was drained
The attacker used a valid signature from an authorized address. The converter’s conversionIn() function trusted that signature and did not verify that matching assets had actually been locked or burned on the other chain. That single missing check let the entire converter balance leave in one transaction.
Keys, not code alone
Before the minting started, ETH was swept from 16 wallets, four of them labeled as SingularityNET or NuNet staff wallets, as Protos reported. Bitquery says most of the compromised signing keys still had not been rotated. That would explain why the attack spread across projects and why a payroll contract later lost $289,575 in USDC.
A valid signature proves who signed. It doesn’t prove anything was locked.
Why did billions of minted tokens turn into only $2.25 million?
Because minting a token is not the same as selling it. The attacker could create hundreds of millions of AGIX, WMTx and CGV, but there were not enough buyers or pool liquidity to absorb them. Real profit came almost entirely from the FET drained from the converter, which already had a deep market.
Per Protos, the attacker sold the real FET for 523 ETH, about $1.2 million, which made up most of the roughly $2.25 million realized. At the other extreme, 500 million CGV fetched around $30 — thin liquidity made the “value” of the minted supply largely theoretical.
What was left on attacker addresses is still large on paper. PeckShield put it at about $16.77 million, mostly 198.3 million AGIX valued at $14.42 million plus 649 ETH. Whether any of that can be cashed out depends on liquidity and on how quickly exchanges block deposits.
| Token | Minted or drained (reported) | Note |
|---|---|---|
| FET | ~8.7M drained (~$1.53M) | Sold for 523 ETH (~$1.2M) |
| NTX | 408.5M minted | Supply hit 1B maximum (Bitquery) |
| AGIX | 260M (PeckShield) / ~896M (Bitquery) | 198.3M left on attacker addresses |
| WMTx | 53.838M (PeckShield) / 500.5M (Bitquery) | World Mobile revoked minting rights |
| CGV | 492.4M (Bitquery) | 500M sold for ~$30 |
How did Fetch.ai, SingularityNET and World Mobile respond?
Fetch.ai says its own contracts were not affected and points to SingularityNET infrastructure, but it paused AGIX→FET conversion and its Ethereum bridge as a precaution. World Mobile confirmed unauthorized WMTx issuance, revoked minting rights and asked exchanges to block deposits of the affected token.
Those are standard containment moves: stop the conversion paths that let fake supply be swapped into real assets, and ask the venues with liquidity to refuse deposits. They also mean ordinary holders may find some routes closed for a while, even if they did nothing wrong.
The incident echoes the Symbiosis bridge exploit a week earlier, where an enormous amount of fake syBTC was minted and only a small fraction cashed out. The pattern repeats: a bridge or converter trusts a message it shouldn’t, supply explodes, and liquidity decides how much damage becomes real.
What it means for swap users
The practical lesson is to know exactly which token, contract and network you receive. After an incident like this, the same ticker can exist in a legitimate and a freshly minted form, and conversion routes may be paused. Avoid accepting or depositing tokens tied to an active exploit until the projects and exchanges confirm what is safe.
SwapZilla doesn’t hold your funds: you compare quotes from several licensed exchange providers, send coins to a deposit address and receive the output in your own wallet. If a provider pauses a token after an incident, that pair may simply be unavailable or a deposit may be refunded, which is why a correct refund address matters. The provider list is on the providers page, and our guide to swapping safely around bridge hacks covers the wider risks.
Final thoughts
The September 19–20 attack across Fetch.ai, NuNet, SingularityNET and World Mobile produced headline numbers in the billions of token units and a realized profit of about $2.25 million. The difference is liquidity: you can mint supply, but you can’t mint buyers.
The deeper problem is keys. A converter that accepted a valid signature without checking that assets were locked, and signing keys that reportedly still had not been rotated, turned one compromise into several. Until those keys change, every connected contract is part of the blast radius.
Minted isn’t worth. Liquidity decides what a hack really costs.